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This study examines payment choice in equity real estate
investment trust (REIT) property acquisitions. Particular
attention is paid to the tax-advantaged medium of exchange
available to some REITs (i.e., operating partnership units). The
tax argument that is often cited as an underlying rationale
for hypotheses relating bidder gains, payment method and
acquisitions is empirically tested via the relationship between
sales price differentials and the method of payment. The payment
signaling hypothesis and other competing medium of exchange
hypotheses are also empirically tested using a data set generously
provided by the National Association of Real Estate Investment
Trusts.
Introduction
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) possess unique features that make them
different from traditional corporations. REITs are passive investment vehicles
whose income is derived mainly from real estate assets. By meeting federally
mandated requirements, they act as conduits to shareholders by avoiding taxes at
the entity level.1
In contrast to traditional corporations, traditional REITs lack a tax-advantaged
method of payment for sellers of property. In traditional corporate acquisitions,
transactions comprised of 50% or more of stock allow the seller to defer capital
gains taxes on the transaction until the stock is sold. The general nonrecognition
rule pertinent to traditional corporations does not apply to REITs since REITs are
considered ‘‘investment companies,’’ (Singer, 1996). Therefore, no seller tax
beneﬁts are realized when stock is used in a REIT property acquisition.
While stock is not a tax-advantaged medium of exchange in REIT transactions, a
tax-advantaged method of payment does exist for some REITs. Umbrella106  Pierzak
partnership real estate investment trusts (UPREITs) are a specialized form of the
REIT structure that can participate in non or less taxable transactions to the seller
through the use of operating partnership units (OPUs). While less popular than
UPREITs, down real estate investment trusts (DownREITs) may also participate
in tax-favored transactions via OPUs.2
The degree of the seller’s immediate tax obligation depends on the extent to which
OPUs are utilized in the transaction. For example, an all OPU transaction would
result in no immediate tax obligation for the seller. The seller can defer the capital
gains tax on the contributed property until the operating partnership sells the
property, the seller exchanges partnership units for REIT shares or the seller sells
the OPUs. In addition, OPUs also have attractive estate planning characteristics,
beneﬁting from a step-up in basis when passed to heirs.
This study focuses on the ability of OPUs to provide sellers with a tax-advantaged
exchange medium. No previous study has examined the method of payment choice
in the REIT industry. This is not surprising, since a tax-advantaged method of
payment for the seller was not available for REITs until the introduction of the
UPREIT in 1992 (Lynn and Bloomﬁeld, 1994). This study provides a number of
new extensions to the traditional mergers and acquisitions literature. First, the
‘‘special’’ payment method available to some REITs, i.e., OPUs, is examined.
Next, an adverse selection model is developed for REIT property acquisitions.
Then, the tax argument that is often cited as an underlying rationale for hypotheses
relating bidder gains, the method of payment, and acquisitions is empirically
tested. Finally, the payment signaling hypothesis and other competing medium of
exchange hypotheses are empirically tested using a data set generously provided
by the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT).
This study is comprised of six sections. Following this introduction, the second
section provides a brief literature review of the traditional mergers and acquisitions
literature and related REIT extensions. The third section develops an adverse
selection model of REIT property acquisitions. The fourth section empirically tests
a relationship derived from the adverse selection model framework dealing with
the tax argument. The ﬁfth section examines abnormal returns to determine
whether support exists for the method of payment signaling hypothesis. The ﬁnal
section is the conclusion.
 Literature Review
The traditional corporate method of payment literature provides the building
blocks for the development of the adverse selection model for REIT property
acquisitions. Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987) examine three competing hypotheses
relating to bidder gains from traditional corporate merger and acquisition activity
and the method of payment choice. These hypotheses are the method of payment
signaling hypothesis, the overpayment hypothesis and the present value
hypothesis.Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  107
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DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) posit that the method of payment may
signal a bidder’s true value. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest managers utilize
securities to their beneﬁt. This implies that bidders may prefer to utilize securities
(cash) for an acquisition when the market overvalues (undervalues) their securities.
The signaling hypothesis suggests that the acquiring ﬁrm’s management uses the
method of payment to release private information regarding their true value. For
signaling to be effective, an incentive must exist for different bidder types not to
mimic one another. The tax premium associated with all cash transactions acts as
this incentive and deters false signaling (Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1983). The
method of payment signaling hypothesis ultimately suggests that acquiring ﬁrms
using cash in acquisitions should expect positive gains, while those using
securities should realize zero or negative gains.
The overpayment hypothesis also uses the tax penalty argument. Given that cash
transactions require larger tax premiums than their ‘‘mixed’’ counterparts, bidders
must pay sellers more for cash transactions, resulting in smaller gains to the
bidder. The use of securities in an acquisition allows the bidder to hedge the
potential overpayment problem by sharing the risk with the seller.
The present value hypothesis simply states that acquisitions should be zero net
present value projects on average. The hypothesis equates the decision to acquire
a ﬁrm/property to a capital budgeting decision. The acquisition announcement
should release positive information regarding the target. However, after the
announcement, other ﬁrms are free to bid for the ﬁrm/property. The end result is
zero gain to the bidder, regardless of the method of payment.
Roll (1986) extends the present value hypothesis and develops a hypothesis
consistent with strong-form market efﬁciency, the ‘‘hubris’’ hypothesis. He
believes that value-maximizing managers are infected by hubris. This arrogance
causes overestimation in target value and results in overpayment that directly
beneﬁts the seller. The end result is that merger or acquisition activity is a zero
sum game.
While the above hypotheses relating to bidder gains all suggest different outcomes,
the major theoretical models, Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989), Berkovitch and
Narayanan (1990), Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) and Brown and
Ryngaert (1991), typically indicate that bidder abnormal returns are expected to
be larger for cash transactions than for securities transactions. This relationship
stems from a signaling argument. Unfortunately, the overall empirical evidence
presented in conjunction with these models is limited.
The empirical literature on the method of payment choice for traditional
corporations is categorized generally by participant, i.e., bidder and target, and
focuses on abnormal returns or the probability of a payment method given some
underlying characteristic. The bidder research indicates that bidder shareholders
typically realize larger abnormal returns in cash transactions relative to securities
transactions and that the acquiring ﬁrm results are consistent with the payment
signaling hypothesis (Pierzak, 1999).108  Pierzak
Only a limited number of studies have analyzed REITs. The two primary areas
of focus are the effects of REIT mergers and acquisitions, Allen and Sirmans
(1987) and McIntosh, Ofﬁcer and Born (1989), and real estate sell-offs on
shareholder wealth, Owers and Rogers (1986), Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans
(1989, 1991), and Myer, He and Webb (1992). Both bidder and target shareholders
experience statistically signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns around merger and
acquisition announcements. The real estate sell-off literature also generally ﬁnds
that sellers and buyers gain in real estate sell-offs, although the signiﬁcance of
these gains is not consistent in all studies.
 An Adverse Selection Model
Given the prevalence of tax and asymmetric information arguments in the
traditional corporate mergers and acquisitions literature, these arguments are
assumed to be appropriate for REIT property acquisitions. Financial theory
suggests that acquiring ﬁrms pay a premium for cash transactions to offset the
seller’s tax burden and/or to compensate for additional tax credits captured by the
buyer (Travlos, 1987). This statement holds for REIT transactions, however,
differences are found in the type of security issued (OPUs vs. stock) and the
rationale for the premium. Due to their special tax treatment, REITs would
typically pay a premium for cash transactions in order to offset the seller’s tax
burden. Corporate tax shields are assumed not to be relevant to REITs due to their
favorable tax status. The asymmetric information argument is also appropriate for
REIT transactions, since it is reasonable to assume that REIT management
possesses specialized information regarding its value.
Using the tax and asymmetric information arguments, an adverse selection model
for equity REIT method of payment choice is developed.3 A simple graphical
analysis similar to the ‘‘self-selection mechanism’’ analyzed in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) is employed. The model’s underlying premise is that the bidder
uses the medium of exchange as a signal of the acquiring REIT’s true value.
Demand and Supply
The model initially assumes that the bidding entity is a REIT and the selling entity
is a single owner with total discretion over the disposition of the property. On the
demand side, bidders are the informed party, but have private information only
about their value and no asymmetric information with respect to the value of the
property/acquisition.
Assuming sellers and bidders have the same valuation for the bidder’s OPUs, the
fairly valued bidder’s proﬁt curve can be represented by the following equation:
BIDDER   k  V  [(j)R  (1  j)R], (1)Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  109
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where, BIDDER is the bidder’s proﬁt, k is a constant, V is the value of the
acquisition, j is the proportion of cash in the transaction with 0  j  1, (1  j)
is the proportion of OPUs in the transaction and R is the minimum non-taxable
compensation required by the seller. These iso-proﬁt lines are represented by a
series of downward sloping parallel lines that have the property of increasing proﬁt
as they approach the origin.
On the supply side, the seller is the uninformed party and must estimate the
amount of OPU compensation required given a particular type of bidder. Sellers
are assumed to be only concerned with expected economic proﬁts. Economic
proﬁts should be equal to zero.
The seller’s expected proﬁt from a fairly valued bidder can be denoted by the
following equation:
SELLER E[ ]  0  C  [j(R  T(n))  (1  j)R], (2)
where, E[ ] is the seller’s expected economic proﬁt, C is the seller’s costs SELLER
associated with the property and T(n) is the tax penalty required by the seller due
to immediate tax obligations associated with cash payments. R  T(n) is the
minimum all cash compensation required by the seller. Remaining variables are
deﬁned the same as in the model’s demand side.
Two different types of bidders are now introduced into the model. Undervalued
and overvalued bidders believe the market undervalues and overvalues their OPUs,
respectively. Bidders are interested in using the method of payment that is
beneﬁcial for their particular type. Given their true underlying value, overvalued
and undervalued bidders could offer all OPU compensation R and RUNDER, OVER
respectively, in lieu of an all cash offer where ROVER  R and RUNDER  R.
In a fair-valued framework, sellers would require greater OPU compensation from
overvalued bidders and less OPU compensation from undervalued bidders in order
to maintain zero expected proﬁt. However, the seller does not know a particular
bidder’s type and must estimate the value of OPU compensation. A seller’s
expected value of overvalued and undervalued OPUs would be and OVER ˆ R
, respectively, where  R and  R. UNDER OVER UNDER ˆˆ ˆ RR R
Equilibrium
Given that both the iso-proﬁt and zero proﬁt curves are linear, the equilibrium
under full information results in corner solutions. As depicted in Exhibit 1, Points
A and B are the equilibrium contracts for overvalued and undervalued bidders,
respectively. Assuming bidders are forced to offer their equilibrium contract,
sellers would be able to distinguish between bidder types by the contract they
offer. However, overvalued bidders prefer the contract assigned to undervalued110  Pierzak
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bidders, Point B, over their assigned contract, Point A. Absent a restricting
mechanism, all bidders will prefer and offer Point B, causing sellers to be unable
to distinguish between bidder types.
Voluntary bidder separation can be accomplished through the use of incentive
compatibility constraints.4 The incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed at
Point C in Exhibit 1. Contracts below Point C on the undervalued bidder’s zero
proﬁt line also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint, but they offer proﬁt
opportunities for the seller. The resulting equilibrium contracts are Points A and
C for overvalued and undervalued bidders, respectively.
The separating equilibrium shows that overvalued bidders will prefer all OPU
transactions and that undervalued bidders will prefer mixed cash and OPU
transactions. As illustrated in Exhibit 1, undervalued bidders are made worse off
than their position in the full information case by being forced to offer Point C
rather than Point B. This result is the standard outcome found in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), where the ‘‘low’’ risk party is harmed by adverse selection.
Introducing Curvature
The assumption that the seller is a single owner with total discretion over the
disposition of the property is now relaxed to allow for multiple owners. MultiplePayment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  111
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owners may differ in their tax bases, tax rates and expectations of future
acquisition activity. Such differences result in varying required tax premiums for
the owners. The owners can be ordered to create an upward sloping supply curve
of owner interests in an all cash or taxable offer (Brown and Ryngaert, 1991).
The introduction of the upward sloping supply curve of owner interests provides
curvature to the sellers’ zero proﬁt lines. The zero proﬁt lines are redrawn as
downward sloping convex curves in Exhibit 2. The introduction of the curvature
shows a new separating equilibrium with overvalued and undervalued bidders
offering Contracts A and C, respectively. Both bidder types offer mixed bids, but
undervalued bidders always offer a contract with a larger portion of cash.
The adverse selection model that incorporates curvature is a more realistic model
for REIT transactions. The equity REIT property acquisition data sample shows
very few transactions where the method of payment is all OPUs; most transactions
are mixed or all cash. While the model does not predict an all cash outcome,
undervalued bidders may feel compelled to offer all cash rather than mixed
compensation. For instance, undervalued bidders may have to offer a proportion
of cash so much greater than overvalued bidders that they elect to offer all cash.
Testable Predictions
The sales price differentials for undervalued and overvalued bidders are deﬁned
by the following equations:
DIFF CASH MIXED SP  SP  SP (3) UNDER UNDER UNDER
and
DIFF CASH MIXED SP  SP  SP , (4) OVER OVER OVER
respectively. SP and SP are the sales prices for an all cash deal for CASH CASH
UNDER OVER
undervalued and overvalued bidders, respectively. SP and SP are the MIXED MIXED
UNDER OVER
sales prices for a mixed offer for undervalued and overvalued bidders, respectively.
Focusing only on the payment method, all cash sales prices should be equal. Both
SP and SP lie on iso-proﬁt lines further from the origin than their CASH CASH
UNDER OVER
counterparts, SP and SP , suggesting k  k and implying MIXED MIXED CASH MIXED
UNDER OVER
SP  SP for both bidder types. As illustrated in Exhibit 2, Contract C CASH MIXED
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From the adverse selection model, undervalued bidders are associated with offers
containing larger portions of cash than overvalued bidders. Extending this
outcome, undervalued bidders are assumed to be associated with all cash offers
and overvalued bidders are assumed to be associated with mixed offers. Larger
sales price differentials are associated with overvalued bidders (mixed offers)
relative to undervalued bidders (all cash offers). Thus, as the sales price differential
increases, the probability of mixed cash and OPU use in an equity REIT property
acquisition increases. Empirical support for this relationship would offer
credibility for the tax argument.
 Taxes and Selectivity Bias
Empirical Methodology
The tax argument can be directly tested using the methodology employed in
Munneke (1996). A probit estimation can be utilized to estimate the effect of the
sales price differential.5 The probit can be written as:Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  113
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DIFF   (SP )   , i  1,2,...,j, j  1,...,N, (5) ii i
where, SP  SP ,  is the coefﬁcient vector and i is the DIFF CASH MIXED SP ii i
standard normal error term. The probit is estimated over the entire sample of N
observations with j mixed observations and N  j all cash observations. A
transaction utilizes a combination of cash and OPUs if i  0 and uses all cash
if i  0.
In order to estimate SP , two separate sales price equations are estimated. One DIFF
i
is estimated for property acquisitions paid for via a combination of cash and OPUs
and the other is estimated for all cash transactions. The sales price equations have
the following multiplicative forms:6
MIXED    Z  Z  Z v 12 1 m 11 i 22 i n ni i SP   XX ...Xe , (6) i 01 i 2im i
i  1,2,...,j,
CASH   W  W ... W 	 12 1 m 11 i 22 in n i i SP   YY ...Ye , (7) i 01 i 2im i
i  j  1,j  2,...N.
SPi is the sales price of the ith transaction. X to X and Y and Ymi are 1im i 1i
independent variables, which do not take a magnitude of zero. Z to Z and W1i 1in i
to Wni are explanatory variables, which can take a magnitude of zero or near zero.
The ’s, ’s, ’s, and ’s are parameters to be estimated. vi and 	i equal the
respective random error terms.
After transforming the sales price equations via the natural logarithm, the
following notation appropriately describes the sales price differential:
DIFF CASH MIXED ˆˆ ln SP  ln SP  ln SP . (8) ii i
The problem with the above estimation is that it does not take into account the
possibility of sample selection bias. The bias may be present because the data is
separated into two classiﬁcations and each group may have unobservable
characteristics that are favorable to its respective group. The bias exists because
the conditional expectation of the error terms in the value equations may not equal
zero even when the unconditional means are equal to zero. More speciﬁcally,
E[vi  i  0]  0 and E[vi  i  0]  0, when E[vi]  0, and E[	i  i  0]
 0 and E[	i  i  0]  0, when E[	i]  0.114  Pierzak
To avoid these difﬁculties, the correction procedure developed by Lee (1978) is
used. Restating the original probit equation with new notation from the
transformations results in the following:
DIFF  (ln SP )   , i  1,2,...,j, j  1,...,N. (9) ii i
Substituting results in the following reduced form probit:
CASH MIXED   (ln SP  ln SP )  , (10) ii i
CASH MIXED   (ln SP  ln SP )  (v  	)   and (11) ii i i i i
  
U  , i  1,2,...,N. (12) ii ii

t is a vector of coefﬁcients, Ui is the union of explanatory variables in the
transformed sales price equations and i  i  (vi  	i).
The probit estimates and Mills ratios, SELECT, are computed next. The Mills
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where, (
iZi) is the standard normal density function and 
(
iZi)i st h e
cumulative density function. The respective Mills ratios are introduced as
explanatory variables in the two sales price equations to test for sample selection
bias and produce consistent coefﬁcient estimates. If the Mills ratios are signiﬁcant
in their respective sales price equations, the correction procedure must be used to
calculate the predicted values. If the Mills ratios are not signiﬁcant, the addition
of the correction variable may be deemed unnecessary to calculate the predicted
values.
Using the appropriate equations, the natural log of sales price of the property in
each state is predicted. These predicted values are used to calculate the predicted
sales price differential, ln . The predicted sales price differential is used as DIFF ˆ SPi
the only independent variable in the structural probit where *  0 in all cashPayment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  115
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transactions and *  1 for mixed method of payment acquisitions. This
speciﬁcation tests the impact of the predicted sales price differential on the method
of payment choice by examining the direction, degree and signiﬁcance of the
estimated coefﬁcient. The estimated coefﬁcient of the predicted sales price variable
is expected to be signiﬁcant and positive.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data utilized in this study was obtained through the generosity of the NAREIT
Research Committee. Their database originated in July 1994 and has utilized press
releases to document REIT property acquisitions. The data analyzed in this
empirical research extends over the time period from July 1994 through July 1998.
While the database documents approximately 3,300 property transactions, many
of the observations lack the necessary data ﬁelds to be included in this study.
The ﬁnal data sample contains the ofﬁce, industrial, retail, hotel and apartment
property types. The full sample contains a total of 362 observations with 220 all
cash and 142 mixed transactions. Classifying these observations by the size
variable results in two data subsets. The ﬁrst data subset includes the ofﬁce,
industrial and retail property types where acquisition size is measured by square
feet; it contains a total of 195 observations with 113 all cash and 82 mixed
transactions. Further dividing this subset into a sample containing only ofﬁce and
industrial properties results in a total of 111 observations with 55 all cash and 56
mixed transactions. The second data subset includes hotels and apartments where
acquisition size is measured by the number of units; it is comprised of 167
observations where 107 are all cash transactions and the remaining 60 observations
are mixed transactions. Further reducing this subset into a sample containing only
apartment properties results in 132 observations with 87 all cash and 45 mixed
transactions. The descriptive statistics of the total (SF&UNITS), the square feet
(SF), the ofﬁce and industrial (OFF/IND), the units (UNITS) and the apartment
(APT) data sets can be found in Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
The dependent variables in the probit analysis and the sales price estimations are
CASHOPU and LNSP, respectively. CASHOPU is a binary variable that equals
zero for all cash transactions and one for mixed transactions. Mixed transactions
are deﬁned as acquisitions utilizing combinations of cash and OPUs and all
(100%) OPUs. LNSP is the natural log of sales price.
The explanatory variables utilized in this analysis can be categorized as property
characteristics, REIT characteristics or time variables. The property related
variables are LNSF, LNUNITS, DSF, DLNSF, DLNUNITS, OFFIND, OFF and
HOTEL. LNSF and LNUNITS are the natural logs of square feet and number of
units, respectively. DSF is a dummy variable indicating whether physical size is
measured via square feet. DLNSF is the product of DSF and LNSF and DLNUNITS
is the product of one minus DSF and LNUNITS. The simultaneous use of DSF,
DLNSF and DLNUNITS allows for the examination of the entire data sample rather
than partitioning by the physical size measures.116  Pierzak
Exhibit 3  Descriptive Statistics of UPREIT Property Acquisitions with Size Measured









LNSP 3.107 1.274 2.876 1.136 3.465 1.393
DSF 0.539 0.499 0.514 0.501 0.578 0.496
DLNSF 6.852 6.412 6.415 6.309 7.529 6.534
DLNUNITS 2.763 3.060 2.826 2.959 2.666 3.220
REIT
LNMV 5.887 1.154 5.679 1.255 6.208 0.891
MV/BV 5.795 73.690 7.884 94.445 2.558 5.579
SP/MV 0.226 1.666 0.263 2.125 0.169 0.284
TIMEACQ 0.287 0.586 0.318 0.647 0.239 0.475
EXT 0.064 0.244 0.100 0.301 0.007 0.084
NYSE 0.923 0.268 0.896 0.307 0.965 0.185
OUTSBSG 0.058 0.234 0.027 0.163 0.106 0.309
Notes: N  362 for All Acquisitions; N  220 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  142 for Mixed
Acquisitions.









LNSP 3.316 1.291 3.057 1.184 3.673 1.353
LNSF 12.721 1.216 12.490 1.130 13.038 1.265
OFFIND 0.569 0.497 0.487 0.502 0.683 0.468
REIT
LNMV 6.098 1.085 5.844 1.163 6.448 0.857
MV/BV 1.851 1.221 1.757 0.990 1.980 1.478
SP/MV 0.124 0.194 0.099 0.113 0.159 0.265
TIMEACQ 0.169 0.515 0.150 0.586 0.195 0.399
EXT 0.062 0.241 0.097 0.298 0.012 0.110
NYSE 0.928 0.259 0.903 0.298 0.963 0.189
OUTSBSG 0.108 0.311 0.053 0.225 0.183 0.389
Notes: N  195 for All Acquisitions; N  113 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  82 for Mixed
Acquisitions.Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  117
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LNSP 3.382 1.348 3.017 1.190 3.739 1.408
LNSF 12.712 1.205 12.353 0.997 13.065 1.292
OFF 0.712 0.455 0.855 0.356 0.571 0.499
REIT
LNMV 6.222 1.186 5.816 1.370 6.621 0.800
MV/BV 1.732 1.341 1.640 0.984 1.823 1.622
SP/MV 0.118 0.162 0.104 0.121 0.132 0.194
TIMEACQ 0.253 0.639 0.236 0.793 0.268 0.447
EXT 0.081 0.274 0.146 0.356 0.018 0.134
NYSE 0.928 0.260 0.891 0.315 0.964 0.187
OUTSBSG 0.126 0.334 0.036 0.189 0.214 0.414
Notes: N  111 for All Acquisitions; N  55 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  56 for Mixed
Acquisitions.









LNSP 2.863 1.214 2.684 1.055 3.181 1.408
LNUNITS 5.989 0.963 5.811 0.763 6.310 1.183
HOT 0.210 0.408 0.187 0.392 0.250 0.437
REIT
LNMV 5.640 1.187 5.506 1.330 5.880 0.836
MV/BV 10.401 108.479 14.355 135.445 3.349 8.384
SP/MV 0.346 2.442 0.437 3.043 0.183 0.309
TIMEACQ 0.425 0.634 0.495 0.664 0.300 0.562
EXT 0.066 0.249 0.102 0.305 0.000 0.000
NYSE 0.916 0.278 0.888 0.317 0.967 0.181
Notes: N  167 for All Acquisitions; N  107 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  60 for Mixed
Acquisitions.118  Pierzak









LNSP 2.670 1.134 2.423 0.838 3.149 1.450
LNUNITS 5.970 0.963 5.719 0.682 6.455 1.219
REIT
LNMV 5.556 1.094 5.378 1.191 5.901 0.781
MV/BV 2.112 7.460 1.153 5.886 3.966 9.626
SP/MV 0.151 0.337 0.131 0.340 0.190 0.330
TIMEACQ 0.485 0.671 0.540 0.696 0.378 0.614
NYSE 0.894 0.309 0.862 0.347 0.956 0.208
Notes: N  132 for All Acquisitions; N  87 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  45 for Mixed
Acquisitions.
OFFIND, OFF and HOTEL are dummy variables indicating a particular property
type. OFFIND is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for ofﬁce and
industrial properties and a value of zero for retail properties. OFF is a dummy
variable that equals one for ofﬁce properties and zero for industrial or combination
ofﬁce/industrial acquisitions. HOTEL is a dummy variable that equals one for
hotel properties and zero for apartments.
The REIT independent variables are LNMV, MV/BV, SP/MV, TIMEACQ, EXT,
NYSE and OUTSBSG. LNMV, MV/BV and SP/MV are ﬁnancially related REIT
variables. LNMV is the natural log of REIT market value in the nearest available
month prior to the property acquisition announcement. MV/BV is an accounting
ratio of market value to book value. SP/MV is a relative measure of the dollar
size of the acquisition measured by the ratio of acquisition sales price to REIT
market value.7 Of all the explanatory variables, SP/MV and MV/BV are the most
highly correlated. While the true rationale for the positive relationship is unknown,
the relationship is consistent with the concept that as REITs are doing well, they
tend to make larger purchases.
EXT, NYSE and OUTSBSG are dummy variables representing REIT
characteristics. EXT indicates the type of REIT management. EXT equals one for
externally advised REITs and zero for self-advised, self-administered REITs.
NYSE is a dummy variable indicating a REIT’s membership in the New York
Stock Exchange. OUTSBSG is a dummy variable capturing whether an acquisition
is in or outside NAREIT’s subsegment designation for a particular REIT. Since
many REITs tend to specialize in investing in particular property types, NAREIT
categorizes REITs into segments and subsegments. Examples of the NAREIT
subsegments are Diversiﬁed, Industrial, Ofﬁce, Mixed (Ofﬁce and Industrial),Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  119
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Apartment, Strip Center, Regional Mall, Free Standing, Outlet Centers and
Lodging/Resorts.8 TIMEACQ is a discrete explanatory variable showing the
number of times the acquiring REIT has acquired another REIT during the sample
period.
The announcement date variables, B94, B95, B96, B97, B98 and B99, are a set of
continuous time variables which each take a value from zero to one (Bryan and
Colwell, 1982). They are not found to be statistically signiﬁcant when included
in the sales prices estimations, and, thus, are omitted.
Empirical Results
The reduced-form probit estimation results can be found in Exhibit 8. The
selectivity variables calculated from the reduced-form probit are incorporated into
the corrected sales price equations. The selectivity variable (SELECT) is only
signiﬁcant in the all cash SF model and insigniﬁcant in the other all cash and
mixed sales price estimations. Thus, the correction procedure is used in estimating
the coefﬁcients for the SF model, and the other models are estimated without the
addition of the correction variable. The corrected sales price estimation results for
all cash and mixed transactions are reported in Exhibits 9 and 10, respectively.
The results of the uncorrected sales price estimations for all cash and mixed
transactions are displayed in Exhibits 11 and 12, respectively. The empirical
results of the uncorrected and corrected sales price estimations for each model are
very similar.
In the all cash SF model, the estimated parameters for the physical size variable
(LNSF), the REIT market value variable (LNMV) and the relative dollar size
variable (SP/MV) are all positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. The LNSF
and LNMV coefﬁcients are positive and less than one, suggesting a concave
relationship with the dependent variable, LNSP. The LNSF relationship was
anticipated. The positive and signiﬁcant relationship of the relative dollar size of
the acquisition (SP/MV) with the sales price suggests that REITs involved in
larger acquisitions relative to their current market value tend to pay more for their
acquisition.
Examining the empirical results of the all cash and mixed uncorrected sales price
estimations, the physical size variables (DLNSF, DLNUNITS, LNSF and
LNUNITS), the REIT market value (LNMV), and the relative dollar size (SP/MV)
variables have signiﬁcant, positive relationships with the dependent variable
(LNSP). The coefﬁcients of DLNSF, DLNUNITS, LNSF, LNUNITS and LNMV
indicate a signiﬁcant concave relationship with sales price. Contrary to
expectation, the REIT market value to book value (MV/BV) is signiﬁcant in three
of the models. The unexpected MV/BV results may be due to an omitted variable
problem. The dummy variable parameters for ofﬁce (OFF) and hotel (HOTEL)
properties are positive and signiﬁcant in their respective models.
The predicted sales price differential allows for testing of the tax argument. From
the adverse selection model, overvalued and undervalued bidders are assumed to120  Pierzak












CONSTANT 3.531 3.194 1.654 2.856 6.347

































































LLF 219.639 106.364 55.878 101.984 67.824
Notes: The dependent variable is CASHOPU. N  362 for SF&UNITS; N  195 for the SF Model;
N  111 for the OFF/IND Model; N  167 for the UNITS Model; N  132 for the APT Model. LLF
is the log likelihood function statistic. The absolute values of the z-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  121
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Adj. R2 0.8184 0.9005 0.9137 0.8086 0.6933
Notes: The dependent variable is LNSP. N  220 for SF&UNITS; N  113 for the SF Model; N 
55 for the OFF/IND Model; N  107 for the UNITS Model; N  87 for the APT Model. The
absolute values of the z-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.122  Pierzak












































































Adj. R2 0.7344 0.8582 0.8982 0.5881 0.5194
Notes: The dependent variable is LNSP. N  142 for SF&UNITS; N  82 for the SF Model; N  56
for the OFF/IND Model; N  60 for the UNITS Model; N  45 for the APT Model. The absolute
values of the z-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  123
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CONSTANT 4.668 5.878 7.674 4.239 3.987















LNMV 0.427 0.544 0.384 0.344 0.423



























Adj. R2 0.8193 0.8975 0.9150 0.8105 0.6967
Notes: The dependent variable is LNSP. N  220 for SF&UNITS; N  113 for the SF Model; N 
55 for the OFF/IND Model; N  107 for the UNITS Model; N  87 for the APT Model. The
absolute values of the z-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
use mixed and all cash transactions, respectively. By categorizing the predicted
sales price differentials by the method of payment, the means of each group are
compared. The mean of the predicted natural log of the sales price differential for
overvalued bidders is expected to be larger than the mean of predicted natural log
of sales price differential for undervalued bidders. Exhibit 13 indicates that while124  Pierzak


































































Adj. R2 0.7363 0.8599 0.9002 0.5932 0.5232
Notes: The dependent variable is LNSP. N  142 for SF&UNITS; N  82 for the SF Model; N  56
for the OFF/IND Model; N  60 for the UNITS Model; N  45 for the APT Model. The absolute
values of the z-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  125
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Exhibit 13  Average Predicted Sales Price Differential Difference of Means Tests between





Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat.
SF&UNITS 0.062 0.334 0.171 3.464 0.80
SF 0.744 0.716 0.117 0.389 10.79***
OFF/IND 0.031 0.360 0.018 0.274 0.80
UNITS 0.065 0.383 0.634 6.694 0.81
APT 0.091 0.355 0.046 0.462 1.75**
Notes: CASHOPU  1 for Mixed Transactions; CASHOPU  0 for Cash Transactions.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
the expected relationship holds for all of the models, the sales price differential
difference is statistically signiﬁcant in only two of the models, SF and APT.
The predicted sales price differential is expected to have a signiﬁcant impact on
the method of payment choice. It is used as an explanatory variable in a structural
probit estimation to determine its impact on the method of payment choice
(Munneke, 1996). However, the use of an estimated differential may lead to bias
in the standard error. Lee (1978) indicates that the acceptable treatment for this
potential problem is to merely acknowledge its existence due to the complexity
of the correction procedure.
Using the predicted differential as the only explanatory variable assumes a bidder
is indifferent between the method of payment when the all cash tax penalty equals
the proportional cash tax penalty and cost of OPUs in a mixed transaction. Costs
related to the issuance of the OPUs have not been included in this speciﬁcation,
but can be accounted for in the following manner:
DIFF   (ln SP  IC)   (15) ii i i
or
DIFF   IC   ln SP  , (16) ii i i126  Pierzak
Exhibit 14  Structural Probit Estimation Results














































Notes: The dependent variable is CASHOPU. N  362 for SF&UNITS; N  195 for the SF Model;
N  111 for the OFF/IND Model; N  167 for the UNITS Model; N  132 for the APT Model. LLF
is the log likelihood function statistic. The absolute values of the z-Statistics are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
where security issuance costs are represented by ICi. Since issuance costs are
unavailable for each observation in the sample, the ﬁxed costs associated with
OPU issuance can be captured by incorporating a constant term into the model.
The constant term is anticipated to have a negative sign. The structural probit
estimation results are available in Exhibit 14.
The results from Exhibit 14 indicate that the SF models provide the strongest
support for the proposed relationship. All of the explanatory variables in both SF
models have the anticipated sign and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The APTPayment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  127
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model also shows support for the prediction. The coefﬁcient of the predicted sales
price differential in APT Model II is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and the constant
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The predicted sales price premium coefﬁcients in
all of the remaining models indicate the correct direction, but are not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. The intercepts in all of the models have the correct negative
sign and are statistically different from zero, except for the OFF/IND data set
where the intercept is positive and not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Thus, the
structural probit estimations support the prediction that as the predicted sales price
differential increases, the probability of mixed cash and OPU usage in an equity
UPREIT property acquisition increases and offer credibility for the tax argument.
 Acquiring REIT Shareholder Returns
The tax argument is often stated as an underlying rationale for the payment
signaling hypothesis. The payment signaling hypothesis is developed via the
adverse selection model and states that undervalued bidders always prefer to use
a larger proportion of cash than overvalued bidders. Assuming the method of
payment signaling hypothesis correctly describes acquiring REIT behavior,
acquiring REITs are expected to realize larger abnormal returns in cash
transactions relative to all OPU or mixed transactions. If the abnormal return
empirical ﬁndings fail to support the results from the REIT adverse selection
model, the ﬁndings may conﬁrm one of the other hypotheses presented by
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987). The overpayment hypothesis states that REITs
using cash for property acquisitions should anticipate smaller gains than REITs
using mixed ﬁnancing; the present value hypothesis states that bidder gain should
be zero, regardless of the method of payment.
Empirical Methodology
A standard event-time methodology is employed to determine the effect of a
property acquisition on acquiring REIT shareholder wealth. Following Allen and
Sirmans (1987), the estimation period runs from 120 to 41 days prior to the ﬁrst
announcement of the property acquisition from the wire services and is denoted
by days (120, 41). The event period is deﬁned as the forty days before and
after the announcement, as well as the announcement day itself, for a total of 81
days. The event period is denoted by days (40, 40), where the announcement
date is day 0.
Rj represents the arithmetic return for security j on day t. 	j designates the simple ,t
average of security j’s daily returns in the period (120, 41) and is represented
by the following:
41 1
	  R . (17)  jj ,t 79 t120128  Pierzak
The prediction error, or excess return, for security j on day t is written as:
E  R  	. (18) j,tj ,tj
The tested null hypothesis is that the mean excess return on day 0 is equal to
zero. The average excess return for a portfolio of N REITs is represented by:
N
¯ E  (1/N) E . (19)  tj ,t
j1
The standard deviation of the average excess return is equal to:
1/2 41




¯ X  (1/80) E . (21)   Et
t120
Assuming t is drawn from a stationary and independent normal distribution, a ¯ E
one-tailed t-test determines whether is signiﬁcantly different from zero. ¯ Et
Cumulative excess returns are calculated by summing average excess returns over
a window of time. These returns are represented by the following:
b
¯ CE(a,b)  E, (22)  t
ta
where, 40  a  b  40. The test statistic employed for determining whether
cumulative excess returns are statistically different from zero is:Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  129
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b
2 t  CE(a,b) ˆ  . (23)   E ta
In addition to testing the cumulative excess returns, difference of means tests are
computed to determine whether a statistically signiﬁcant difference exists between
average cash and mixed prediction errors over identical time intervals.9
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Using data provided by NAREIT, the data was screened for desirable data
elements. The initial data set was further supplemented by two additional sources.
Daily return data was obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and monthly market value data was obtained from COMPUSTAT.
Observations were required to have a minimum of 30 trading days in the
estimation period, days (120, 41). Albeit minimally, additional observations
were eliminated due to missing return and/or market value data. Finally, using
The Wall Street Journal Index, observations were excluded where the acquisition
announcement coincided with, or was in close proximity to, major corporate
events like earnings and dividend announcements. The ﬁnal data sample contains
a total of 217 REIT property acquisitions with 133 cash and 84 mixed cash and
OPU transactions.
Empirical Results
Daily prediction errors, t-Statistics and cumulative daily prediction errors for all,
cash and mixed property acquisition announcements are calculated over the entire
event period, days (40, 40).10 In all of the samples, the announcement date,
day 0, is not associated with a signiﬁcant abnormal return. However, a variety of
days in the 21-day period that includes the announcement day and the 10 days
prior to and after the announcement, days (10, 10), do experience statistically
signiﬁcant daily abnormal returns. An examination of The Wall Street Journal
Index reveals that no major corporate events appear to coincide with these dates.
Thus, no systematic events appear to be driving these results.
Cumulative daily prediction errors are calculated for various time intervals to
further examine the abnormal returns. Exhibit 15 displays the cumulative daily
prediction errors and their associated t-Statistics for the full sample of all, cash
and mixed acquisitions. As is evidenced by the chart, the post-announcement
interval, days (1, 40), are associated with signiﬁcant, negative cumulative
prediction errors. In addition, the entire event period, days (40, 40), is
characterized by signiﬁcant, abnormal returns for the all and cash data samples.130  Pierzak








CE(40,40) 1.79 2.00** 1.92 1.56* 1.58 1.26
CE(40,1) 0.47 0.74 0.74 0.86 0.03 0.04
CE(1,40) 1.36 2.14** 1.25 1.46* 1.54 1.74**
CE(10,10) 0.14 0.30 0.03 0.05 0.42 0.65
CD(5,5) 0.08 0.24 0.14 0.30 0.01 0.03
CE(2,2) 0.06 0.27 0.11 0.37 0.34 1.08
CD(1,1) 0.04 0.20 0.19 0.82 0.21 0.88
CE(1,0) 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.83 0.18 0.92
0 E 0.05 0.47 0.08 0.61 0.01 0.07
Notes: N  217 for All Acquisitions; N  133 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  84 for Mixed
Acquisitions.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
All of the other examined windows have cumulative daily prediction errors that
are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Given the lack of statistically signiﬁcant
abnormal returns around the acquisition announcements, bidding REITs appear to
treat property acquisition decisions like capital budgeting decisions. Thus, the
results from the cumulative daily prediction errors appear to support the present
value hypothesis, where bidding ﬁrms experience zero gains, regardless of the
method of payment.
The relevance of the adaptation of hypotheses from the traditional corporate
ﬁnance mergers and acquisitions literature to REIT property acquisitions may be
questioned since the size of these property acquisitions may be small relative to
traditional corporate mergers and acquisitions. However, the relative size variable,
SP/MV, indicates that, on average, these property acquisitions are not insigniﬁcant
portions of a REIT’s pre-acquisition market value.11 To address this potential
concern, the samples were screened and reduced to include observations where
the relative size variable was greater than or equal to 2%, 5% and 10%.
Exhibit 16 displays the cumulative daily prediction errors for the full sample less
the 2% SP/MV screen. The cash sample has a negative abnormal return that is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the (1,0) time interval. The mixed sample has
signiﬁcant, positive cumulative abnormal returns for three short time intervals
surrounding the announcement, days (2, 2), (1, 1) and (1,0). The resultsPayment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  131
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CE(40,40) 1.73 1.71** 1.86 1.37* 1.52 1.02
CE(40,1) 0.38 0.54 0.68 0.71 0.09 0.09
CE(1,40) 1.38 1.94** 1.18 1.24 1.69 1.61*
CE(10,10) 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.21 0.28
CE(5,5) 0.12 0.32 0.30 0.61 0.18 0.32
CE(2,2) 0.06 0.24 0.25 0.75 0.56 1.51*
CE(1,1) 0.00 0.01 0.29 1.11 0.47 1.62*
CE(1,0) 0.02 0.14 0.29 1.35* 0.40 1.73**
0 E 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.49
Notes: N  179 for All Acquisitions; N  110 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  69 for Mixed
Acquisitions.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
indicate that the abnormal returns for bidding ﬁrms using cash are less than the
abnormal returns for REITs using mixed payments. These results provide support
for the overpayment hypothesis.
Exhibit 17 displays the cumulative daily prediction errors for the full sample less
the 5% SP/MV screen. The results of the all and mixed samples show that
signiﬁcant, negative abnormal returns exist for the entire event and post-
announcement event periods. No statistically signiﬁcant results are found for the
short intervals surrounding the announcement date. The 5% SP/MV screen results
provide support for the present value hypothesis.
Exhibit 18 displays the cumulative daily prediction errors for the full sample less
the 10% SP/MV screen. No statistically signiﬁcant results are found in the all and
cash samples. The mixed sample shows signiﬁcant negative returns in the overall
event and post-announcement periods, and signiﬁcant positive returns in the (1,
0) time window. The results can be interpreted as providing additional support for
the overpayment hypothesis, since gains to bidders using cash are smaller than
the gains to bidders using cash and OPUs.
Frequency tables for the cumulative daily prediction error for the time interval
(1, 0) for the full sample and the 2%, 5% and 10% SP/MV screens were
calculated to address concerns that the observed outcomes may be the result of
data outliers.12 In all instances, the abnormal returns are between 6.00% and132  Pierzak








CE(40,40) 2.23 1.69** 2.00 1.02 2.52 1.58*
CE(40,1) 0.68 0.74 1.03 0.75 0.23 0.20
CD(1,40) 1.58 1.71** 1.02 0.74 2.30 2.05**
CD(10,10) 0.44 0.66 0.24 0.24 0.70 0.86
CD(5,5) 0.30 0.61 0.41 0.56 0.16 0.26
CD(2,2) 0.04 0.11 0.29 0.59 0.45 1.14
CE(1,1) 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.50 0.29 0.93
CE(1,0) 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.58 0.28 1.13
0 E 0.03 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.04
Notes: N  128 for All Acquisitions; N  72 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  56 for Mixed
Acquisitions.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
5.00%, with the majority of the observations in the 4.00% to 4.00% range. Thus,
outliers do not appear to be driving the observed results.
As a ﬁnal series of tests to determine whether a difference exists between REITs
acquiring properties with cash or mixed payment forms, a difference of means
test was employed. Exhibits 19, 20, 21 and 22 display the results for the difference
of means tests for the full and screened data samples. Exhibits 19 and 21 show
the results for the full and 5% SP/MV screened samples, respectively. In a one-
tailed test, the pooled t-Statistics for both samples indicate that the mean
cumulative prediction errors of cash transactions are not different from mixed
transactions for all examined intervals at the traditional 1%, 5% and 10% levels
of signiﬁcance. These results provide support for the present value hypothesis.
Exhibits 20 and 22 display the difference of means tests for the full sample less
the 2% and 10% SP/MV screens, respectively. Exhibit 20 provides the strongest
support for the overpayment hypothesis with time intervals (2, 2), (1, 1)
and (1,0) signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 5% levels, respectively. Exhibit 22 also
provides support for the overpayment hypothesis, with a statistically signiﬁcant
mean difference in the (1,0) time interval.Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  133
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CE(40,40) 1.83 1.04 0.94 0.30 2.77 1.51*
CE(40,1) 0.41 0.33 0.17 0.08 0.67 0.52
CE(1,40) 1.45 1.17 0.69 0.31 2.26 1.74**
CE(10,10) 0.56 0.62 0.24 0.15 0.89 0.95
CE(5,5) 0.50 0.76 0.46 0.40 0.53 0.78
CE(2,2) 0.20 0.45 0.21 0.27 0.18 0.40
CE(1,1) 0.18 0.51 0.02 0.03 0.34 0.96
CE(1,0) 0.02 0.08 0.38 0.77 0.45 1.56*
0 E 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.73
Notes: N  76 for All Acquisitions; N  39 for Cash Acquisitions; and N  37 for Mixed
Acquisitions.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Exhibit 19  Cumulative Daily Prediction Error Differential Means Tests between Mixed and Cash Property
Acquisitions for Full Sample
Interval
Mixed Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%)
Cash Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%) Pooled t-Stat
CE(40,40) 0.019 1.307 0.024 1.567 0.18
CE(40,1) 0.001 1.336 0.019 1.556 0.55
CE(1,40) 0.038 1.277 0.031 1.574 0.22
CE(10,10) 0.020 1.282 0.002 1.649 0.47
CE(5,5) 0.001 1.287 0.012 1.680 0.21
CE(2,2) 0.068 1.319 0.023 1.618 0.96
CE(1,1) 0.071 1.332 0.064 1.474 1.18
CE(1,0) 0.090 1.338 0.080 1.523 1.19
Notes:
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.134  Pierzak
Exhibit 20  Cumulative Daily Prediction Error Differential Means Tests between Mixed and Cash Property
Acquisitions for Full Sample Less 2% SP/MV Screen
Interval
Mixed Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%)
Cash Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%) Pooled t-Stat
CE(40,40) 0.019 1.310 0.023 1.623 0.16
CE(40,1) 0.002 1.351 0.017 1.610 0.52
CE(1,40) 0.042 1.264 0.029 1.633 0.35
CE(10,10) 0.010 1.280 0.002 1.719 0.16
CE(5,5) 0.016 1.297 0.028 1.755 0.59
CE(2,2) 0.112 1.357 0.051 1.676 1.52*
CE(1,1) 0.155 1.378 0.096 1.510 1.94**
CE(1,0) 0.202 1.383 0.144 1.556 2.14**
Notes:
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Exhibit 21  Cumulative Daily Prediction Error Differential Means Tests between Mixed and Cash Property
Acquisitions for Full Sample Less 5% SP/MV Screen
Interval
Mixed Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%)
Cash Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%) Pooled t-Stat
CE(40,40) 0.031 1.335 0.025 1.744 0.20
CE(40,1) 0.006 1.364 0.026 1.702 0.46
CE(1,40) 0.057 1.304 0.026 1.780 0.71
CE(10,10) 0.033 1.324 0.011 1.818 0.35
CE(5,5) 0.014 1.351 0.037 1.879 0.25
CE(2,2) 0.090 1.397 0.058 1.804 1.14
CE(1,1) 0.095 1.382 0.063 1.688 0.99
CE(1,0) 0.141 1.347 0.089 1.738 1.16Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  135
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Exhibit 22  Cumulative Daily Prediction Error Differential Means Tests between Mixed and Cash Property
Acquisitions for Full Sample Less 10% SP/MV Screen
Interval
Mixed Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%)
Cash Acquisitions
Mean (%) Std. Dev. (%) Pooled t-Stat
CE(40,40) 0.034 1.332 0.012 1.907 0.54
CE(40,1) 0.017 1.357 0.004 1.837 0.21
CE(1,40) 0.056 1.300 0.017 1.962 0.65
CE(10,10) 0.043 1.357 0.012 2.056 0.35
CE(5,5) 0.048 1.408 0.042 2.205 0.05
CE(2,2) 0.037 1.411 0.043 2.013 0.03
CE(1,1) 0.113 1.449 0.007 1.954 0.47
CE(1,0) 0.225 1.352 0.191 2.115 1.44*
Note:
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
 Conclusion
This study examines payment choice in equity REIT property acquisitions. It
expands the extant mergers and acquisitions literature in a number of ways. First,
it examines the gains to acquiring shareholders in REIT property acquisitions and
the ‘‘special’’ method of payment available to some REITs (i.e., OPUs). Next, it
develops an adverse selection model of REIT property acquisitions. Finally, the
tax argument and three competing hypotheses relating the method of payment and
bidder abnormal returns are empirically tested.
Using the method of payment literature for traditional corporations as a
foundation, a signaling model is assumed to be appropriate for REIT property
acquisitions and an adverse selection model is developed. The model’s underlying
premise is that the bidder uses the medium of exchange as a signal of the acquiring
REIT’s true value. The model shows that undervalued bidders prefer to use larger
amounts of cash than overvalued bidders. Extending the model, undervalued
bidders are assumed to be associated with all cash transactions and overvalued
bidders are assumed to be associated with mixed transactions. The model results
in two testable predictions. First, as the sales price differential increases, the
probability of mixed cash and OPU use in an equity REIT property acquisition is
expected to increase. Second, assuming the use of cash is associated with the
release of positive information, acquiring shareholders are expected to realize
larger wealth gains in cash acquisitions versus all OPU or mixed acquisitions.136  Pierzak
The tax argument derived from the adverse selection model is empirically tested
via sales price differentials. The empirical results support the model’s prediction.
The average predicted sales price differentials exhibit the anticipated relationship
and the structural probit results show a positive relationship between the predicted
sales price differential and the method of payment. This study was successful in
providing support for the tax argument that is often used as the underlying
rationale for the payment signaling and overpayment hypotheses.
Having established support for the tax argument, abnormal returns are examined
to determine whether empirical support exists for the payment signaling
hypothesis. The overall results indicate that no support is found for the developed
signaling model. The results indicate support for the overpayment and present
value hypotheses. The overpayment hypothesis is favored in a relative sense
because the evidence tends to show that excess returns are greater for REITs using
mixed payments in comparison to REITs using all cash payments, but not all of
the ﬁndings are statistically signiﬁcant. However, Roll’s ‘‘hubris’’ hypothesis
cannot be ruled out, due to lack of available data for testing. The REIT abnormal
return results are in stark contrast to the traditional corporate method of payment
empirical ﬁndings in Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987), suggesting that the
institutional characteristics of REITs truly make them different from traditional
corporations.
In conclusion, the tax argument and the overpayment and/or present value
hypotheses appear to be relevant to REIT property acquisitions. These results
reinforce the belief that REITs are different from traditional corporations. While
this study is the ﬁrst examination of REIT property acquisitions, further research
can be conducted when additional and more complete data becomes available.
Areas of future research include the examination of theoretical models and
empirical methodologies that utilize the fraction of cash used in acquisitions. Other
areas of future research include an examination of the long-term performance of
REITs involved in property acquisitions.
 Endnotes
1 For a detailed discussion of the federally mandated requirements, see Kelley (1990),
Lowy (1993), Lynn and Bloomﬁeld (1994), Lee (1995), Scherrer (1996) and Ling and
Ryngaert (1997).
2 For a brief discussion regarding UPREITs, DownREITs and their differences, see Payne
(1998).
3 Adverse selection models are developed to analyze insurance markets and mortgage
lending in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Brueckner (1994), respectively.
4 For a deﬁnition of incentive compatibility constraints, see Brueckner (1997:424–25).
5 A probit model is used due to limited data availability regarding the fractional amount
of cash and operating partnership units in individual property acquisitions. However,
sufﬁcient data is available to distinguish between all cash and mixed transactions.
6 The beneﬁts of the multiplicative form are discussed in Bryan and Colwell (1982).Payment Choice in REIT Property Acquisitions  137
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7 The importance of this variable is suggested by Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, Jr. (1983).
8 NAREIT ONLINE at www.nareit.com.
9 For a description of the pooled t-test, see Bhattacharya (1987).
10 Tables displaying the daily prediction errors, t-Statistics and cumulative daily prediction
errors for all, cash and mixed property acquisition announcements are available from
the author on request.
11 The mean values for the relative size variable, SP/MV, are 0.1694, 0.1442 and 0.2093
for all, cash and mixed acquisitions, respectively. The median values for relative size
variable, SP/MV, are 0.057, 0.052 and 0.090 for all, cash and mixed acquisitions,
respectively.
12 Frequency tables for the cumulative daily prediction error for the time interval (1, 0)
for the full sample and the 2%, 5% and 10% SP/MV screens are available from the
author on request.
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